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NOTES
Measuring Semantic Relatedness:
A Proposal for a New Textual Tool
Judicial decisions, statutes, constitutions, sentencing guidelines, and
ERISA-related documents have at least one thing in common: at a molecular
level, the laws are all composed of words. The scientific study of linguistics,
particularly the field of semantics, analyzes what words mean and how they are
connected with each other. And yet, thus far, the legal field has taken little notice
of academic and technological breakthroughs in the field of linguistic
semantics. This Note seeks to highlight the potential utility of linguistic
semantic tools in interpreting legal texts. Specifically, applying algorithms to a
free online lexical database allows anyone with a computer to measure the level
of relatedness between two nouns. Like more classical and widely accepted
textual tools, these algorithms shed light on the plain meaning and semantic
nuances of different words. Applying them to two prominent federal circuit
splits regarding federal sentencing guidelines and ERISA benefits further
underscores their usefulness across the legal discipline. The legal field stands
to benefit from employing semantic linguistic algorithms in the law to help
resolve semantic ambiguity in legal texts and arrive at more consistent,
quantifiable conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Felix Frankfurter, when speaking of the legal profession,
declared that “[a]ll our work, our whole life is a matter of semantics,
because words are the tools with which we work, the materials out of
which laws are made, out of which the Constitution was written.
Everything depends on our understanding of them.”1 Courts’ reliance
on textual tools to interpret legal texts further illustrates the
importance of language and linguistics to legal analysis.2 And yet, thus
far, the legal field has taken little notice of the linguistic study of
semantics, which analyzes the meaning of words.3 In particular,
semantic linguistics has developed such that anyone with a computer
can now measure the semantic distance between two nouns (how
similar two words may be) online for free.4 These online tools provide

1.
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN & DONALD T. BLISS, COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE
LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA’S PROMISE 78 (2010).
2.
See infra Section I.A.
3.
See Nicholas Johnson, Full Circle: General Semantics and the Law, 54 ETC 130,
130 (1997).
4.
See CHRISTIANE FELLBAUM, WORDNET: AN ELECTRONIC LEXICAL DATABASE 2 (2d
prtg. 1999).
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lawyers and judges the opportunity to use an unprecedented level of
precision in analyzing legal texts and applying the facts to the law.
This Note seeks to begin filling the gap between the legal field
and the field of computational semantics. Part I provides background
information on textual tools and the potential overlap with linguistics.
It also explains the computational semantic linguistic tools (WordNet
and the algorithms path, wup, and res) and illustrates how they can be
used to compare different terms. Part II provides the legal support for
using these tools by analogizing their justifications to those of more
well-established linguistic and quantitative tools of statutory
interpretation. Parts III and IV illustrate how useful these tools can be
in legal interpretation by using them to resolve circuit splits in two case
studies. The first circuit split, discussed in Part III, asks whether
holding someone at gunpoint can qualify as “physically restraining” a
victim under the federal sentencing guidelines. The second circuit split,
in Part IV, discusses whether deaths caused by autoerotic asphyxiation
may qualify as accidental deaths or deaths caused by self-inflicted
injury for ERISA purposes. As the case studies show, the computational
semantic linguistic tools are easy to use, well justified in legal
interpretation, and extremely valuable in helping to resolve
semantic ambiguity.
I. TEXTUAL TOOLS AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
In resolving semantic ambiguity, the law already substantially
relies on textual tools to dissect, analyze, and interpret language. A
semantic linguistic tool, WordNet, and associated algorithms can help
shed light on semantic nuances behind individual words. Section A
discusses the history of textual tools and linguistics and their potential
intersection in the legal field. Section B explains the basic mechanics of
how WordNet and semantic algorithms function.
A. Finding Meaning: Textual Tools and Linguistics
“[W]hat is chicken?” Judge Friendly famously asked in a seminal
1960 case regarding contract interpretation.5 More than twenty years
later, Justice Blackmun asked, “[W]hat does the Court mean by
‘permanent’?”6 More recently, the Supreme Court asked, “What is a

5.
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 448 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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‘pole attachment’?”7 A primary job of judges and lawyers is to find the
meaning of ordinary words written in legal texts to apply them to reallife scenarios.
Words and their meanings are therefore integral to the legal
process.8 Meanings of words are so essential that the Supreme Court
has set out a plain meaning rule: when the text of a statute is
unambiguous, the inquiry starts and stops with the statutory text.9
Therefore, sensibly, judges and lawyers start their analysis by
determining the meaning of a legal authority.10 In doing so, legal
practitioners turn to a variety of textual tools.11
Textual tools identify the intrinsic meaning of terms or phrases
and can encompass a wide variety of sources and canons. 12 A classical
tool of textual interpretation is the dictionary.13 Legal practitioners
often use dictionaries to support or oppose a particular interpretation
of a term.14 Specialty dictionaries, such as thesauri and etymology
dictionaries, are also frequently used.15 Textual tools may also account
for syntactic structure. For example, the last antecedent rule dictates
that an explanatory clause or phrase should apply only to the noun or
phrase immediately preceding it.16

7.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 300 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
8.
See Editors’ Foreword, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 769 (1995).
9.
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 631 (2018) (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v.
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
10. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1317 (2018):
[B]oth the judges who start with the words of the statute and those who do not seem to
us to engage in essentially the same mode of contextual analysis . . . . They begin by
trying to understand the statute, the problem the statute addresses, and the issue in
the case at a broad level of generality. This broad lens often seems necessary to
understand what lengthy and complex modern statutes mean.
But see id. at 1315–16 (refuting the notion that all judges start the process of interpretation by
literally reading the whole statute itself).
11. E.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 719–21
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using dictionary definitions and the canons noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis to define the statutory meaning of “harm”).
12. See Stephen J. Safranek, Scalia’s Lament, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 315, 317 (2004).
13. As early as 1894, other law students grappled with the role dictionaries should play in
legal analysis. William C. Anderson, Law Dictionaries, 28 AM. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (1894).
14. Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998) (using dictionary
definitions to argue that “carry” can include “conveyance in a vehicle”), with id. at 139–40
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using a dictionary definition to arrive at the opposite conclusion).
15. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (defining “commerce” using an
etymology dictionary); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988) (using a
thesaurus to define “willful”).
16. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003).
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Textual tools have many possible legal justifications.17 First and
foremost, textual tools can help orient legal practitioners to the
meaning of a legal text.18 The meaning can illuminate how the enacting
Congress would have resolved the issue at hand.19 Under the theory
that courts are agents of the legislature, using textual tools helps
legitimize judicial decisions and “promote fidelity” to Congress.20
Conformity to the “rules” imposed by textual tools also increases
predictability of judicial interpretation.21 This predictability further
serves as a guidepost to the legislature about how courts will implement
legislated acts.22 Although academic discussion of textual tools
increased with the rise of new textualism in the 1990s, largely under
the influence of Justice Antonin Scalia,23 legal practitioners of all
interpretive theories employ textual tools at least as a component of
their legal analysis.24
The study of linguistics is highly relevant to legal analysis and
the field of textual tools. Many textual tools are in fact derived from
principles of linguistics.25 Linguistics, a field of study which predates
Scalia’s textualism by several millennia,26 studies the science behind
human communication, including subfields such as phonology (the
physics of how humans produce sounds), morphology (the building
blocks of how words are made), syntax (grammar), and sociolinguistics
(how socioeconomic factors affect speech).27 Perhaps most importantly
to the legal profession, the study of linguistics also includes semantics—
the study of what words mean.28
In 1995, a handful of legal academics at a symposium hosted by
Northwestern University and Washington University flirted with the
idea of adding linguistics to their legal analysis. 29 For example,
17. For justifications behind individual textual tools, see infra Part III.
18. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 454 (1989).
19. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 (1983).
20. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 415, 425.
21. See id. at 441–42.
22. See id. at 456.
23. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990).
24. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Remarks, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 308 (2017).
25. See infra Section II.A.
26. See RICHARD HUDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO WORD GRAMMAR 103 (2010).
27. See Judith N. Levi, Introduction: “What Is Meaning in a Legal Text?” A First Dialogue for
Law and Linguistics, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 771, 772 (1995).
28. See id.
29. See Editors’ Foreword, supra note 8, at 770 (“[The conference] represented the first
significant interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars of law and linguistics and addressed itself to
a central question: What is meaning in a legal text?”).
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Professor Clark Cunningham, a professor of law, collaborated with
Professor Charles Fillmore, a professor of linguistics, to analyze the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means to “use a firearm.”30
Professor Lawrence Solan contended that linguistics may be useful in
cases where the statute is hard to read or the court must apply real-life
scenarios to the statute.31 While Professor Robert Rasmussen found
statutes on the whole too complex for linguistic analysis, he conceded
that linguistics may be especially helpful in criminal law, where the
goal is to understand the statutory language as an ordinary person
would.32 In contrast, Professor Dennis Patterson dismissed the
application of linguistics to legal texts as “nonsensical.”33
Since the symposium, linguistics expanded to include the
subfield of computational linguistics, which can involve mapping
language into computationally tractable implementations of syntactic
and semantic analysis.34 In short, semantic analysis is now easier and
more advanced with the advent and ubiquity of computers. 35
Computational linguistics has been crucial to the development of
linguistic technologies such as Siri and Google Translate, to name a few.
The use of computational linguistics in the legal field has been
both sparse and controversial. For example, Justice Lee on the Utah
Supreme Court used linguistic tools to settle a question of statutory
interpretation regarding the phrase “discharge of a firearm.”36 He then
delivered an impassioned justification of using linguistic research in his
analysis, arguing that linguistics can help decode language37 and that
computational linguistic tools are transparent and easy to use. 38
Nonetheless, his fellow justices dismissed his findings as “scientific
research” outside of the realm of judging.39 The 2017 Brigham Young
University Law Review symposium on linguistics in the law played out
similarly to the symposium in 1995. For example, Professor Stefan Th.
Gries and Professor Brian G. Slocum’s suggestion that computational

30. Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic
Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of “Use a Firearm,” 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1160 (1995).
31. Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the
Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069, 1072 (1995).
32. Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047, 1053–55 (1995).
33. Dennis Patterson, Against a Theory of Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1153 (1995).
34. See Lenhart Schubert, Computational Linguistics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computationallinguistics/ [https://perma.cc/ZL9T-3AY3] (giving a broad overview of computational linguistics).
35. See FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 2.
36. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 80–96, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Lee, J., concurring).
37. Id. at ¶¶ 58–63, 356 P.3d at 1276.
38. Id. at ¶¶ 80–88, 356 P.3d at 1281.
39. Id. at ¶¶ 17–20, 356 P.3d at 1265.
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linguistics should be used to ascertain ordinary meaning40 garnered
criticism that linguistics’ appeal was “superficial” and raised issues of
notice and accountability.41
In summary, there is a difference between the way that most
judges and lawyers analyze the meanings of words and the way that
linguists and scientists analyze the meanings of words. While the quest
for the meaning of words underpins all legal analysis, legal academia
and judicial review have so far largely failed to exploit important
principles of linguistic semantics. But recent developments in linguistic
semantics, particularly computational linguistics, are rife with
opportunity for the legal field.
B. New Linguistic Tools
One particular tool, WordNet, has caused a revolution in the
field of computational linguistic analysis of semantics.42 WordNet is
free, easy to use, and operates much like conducting an internet
search.43 Princeton University operates WordNet mostly through its
Department of Computer Science.44 Anyone can apply algorithms to
WordNet’s database for free to measure and quantify how two terms
may be semantically related—namely, how two terms’ meanings relate
or connect to each other.45 Measuring semantic relatedness is especially
valuable in legal interpretation, where judges must categorically apply
facts to legal language and decide whether the terms match. This
Section explores and explains how WordNet functions as a lexical
database and allows for computation of three algorithms—path,
wup, and res—that can quantify the semantic relatedness between
two nouns.
1. WordNet as a Lexical Database
WordNet is a web tool and app developed by Princeton
University that serves as a large lexical database or taxonomy.46
40. Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017
BYU L. REV. 1417, 1418–19 (2017).
41. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV.
1503, 1504–05 (2017).
42. FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 12–17 (listing research projects and improvements in
computational linguistics using WordNet as a database).
43. What Is WordNet?, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu (last visited Dec. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/SD7C-76Q3].
44. People, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/people (last visited Dec. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/CY6B-MSGP].
45. See, e.g., FELLBAUM, supra note 4, at 14–16.
46. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43.
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WordNet has many functions, including as a regular dictionary.
Professional lexicographers write the definitions associated with each
term, calling the different definitions “senses” and denoting different
parts of speech.47 Thus far in the legal world, WordNet’s use has mainly
been confined to this dictionary function.48 WordNet also functions as a
thesaurus, grouping senses that are synonymous with each other
together in data sets called “synsets.”49 Distinct from a dictionary or
thesaurus, however, WordNet assigns each separate sense of a word a
numerical value based on the frequency at which that sense was used
in language data that has been tagged by semantic linguists.50
Additionally, WordNet tracks super-subordinate relationships,
also known as ISA relationships. 51 ISA relationships denote hypernyms
and hyponyms.52 A hypernym is a “word whose meaning includes a
group of other words.”53 For example, “furniture” is a hypernym of
“chair” because “furniture” encompasses groups of other words like
“chair,” “sofa,” and “bed.” Similarly, “animal” is a hypernym of “dog” and
“rabbit.” Conversely, a hyponym is “a word whose meaning is included
in the meaning of another word.”54 Therefore, “chair” is a hyponym of
“furniture,” and “dog” is a hyponym of “animal.”
WordNet has several other functions that are not as relevant to
this Note’s analysis, such as tracking how one noun may constitute a
part of another (meronymy), how specifically a verb describes an event
(troponymy), and how adjectives may oppose each other (antonymy).55
Although these functions may be useful for other analyses, they are
outside the scope of this Note.
As a free tool whose taxonomy can be easily downloaded and
used for other computational programs, WordNet has inspired a wave
of research and breakthroughs in computational semantics language
processing.56 For example, the web app Word Similarity for Java
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Johnson v. Portz, 707 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (D. Del. 2010); Robertson v. Health
Net of Cal., Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (casting skepticism on the source).
49. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43.
50. Frequently Asked Questions, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/frequently-askedquestions (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6AYP-XZ93].
51. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43. The phrase ISA literally means is-a; for example, a
poodle is a dog.
52. Id.
53. Hypernym, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/hypernym (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N8CP-58TT].
54. Hyponym, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/hyponym (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4UDE-59JM].
55. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43.
56. Related Projects, WORDNET, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/related-projects (last visited
Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V33J-PXQ2].
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(“WS4J”) measures the semantic relatedness of words, using WordNet
as a database and employing algorithms based on the research of
various linguistic scholars.57 For the sake of explanation, the following
sections explore these algorithms by testing how similar a “button”58 is
to a “coin.”59 The resulting data would be meaningless without context
of how similar other terms may be. Therefore, as a null variable, the
following sections also measure the semantic distance between
“nickel”60 and “coin.” Obviously, the human expectation is that “nickel”
and “coin” should be more closely semantically related than “button”
and “coin.” Regardless, if an alien were dropped on earth with just
WordNet, these algorithms, and the knowledge that humans might pay
for gumballs with coins, how would he know which round metal pieces—
nickels or buttons—to use? WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and
res would help him figure out how to buy a gumball.
2. Measuring Blunt Distance with Path
Each sense of a term is a “node” in the giant web of words that
WordNet provides. A simple algorithm, path, measures semantic
relatedness by finding the shortest path among the nodes of ISA
relationships between senses.61 The first step is to find the Least
Common Subsumer (“LCS”) between two nodes. The LCS is a hypernym
that encompasses two nodes.62 For example, the LCS of “button” and
“coin” is “entity” because both buttons and coins are types of entities.63

57. WS4J DEMO,
http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/
(last visited
Dec.
15,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/J6FP-TVFZ].
58. This analysis uses the first sense of “button,” meaning “a round fastener sewn to shirts
and coats.” [Button], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=button&sub=
Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=000 (last visited
Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6QN5-XFQZ].
59. This analysis uses the nominal sense of “coin,” defined as “a flat metal piece (usually a
disc) used as money.” [Coin], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=coin&
sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=0000
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M3HN-4RS4].
60. The definition used is a “United States coin worth one-twentieth of a dollar.” [Nickel],
WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=nickel&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=
&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=
(last
visited
Dec.
15,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/JN2F-V673].
61. Linguists generally acknowledge this algorithm as emanating from the work of Roy Rada
& Ellen Bicknell, Ranking Documents with a Thesaurus, 40 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. 304, 305
(1989). See, e.g., CHAOMEI CHEN & MIN SONG, REPRESENTING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: THE ROLE
OF UNCERTAINTY 152 (2017).
62. This concept is analogous to finding the least common denominator between fractions.
63. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/?mode=w&s1=&w1
=button%23n%231&s2=&w2=coin%23n%231 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FFH8QKLK].
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There is no more specific LCS in WordNet’s taxonomy.64 In contrast, the
LCS of “nickel” and “coin” is “coin” because “nickel” is a hyponym of
“coin.”65 Once the LCS is determined, the algorithm path counts the
number of nodes between the two senses at issue. The shortest path
between “button” and “coin” requires traveling eighteen nodes in the
ISA relationship.66 Because 1/18 is approximately 0.06, the result of
path(button, coin) is 0.06.67 In contrast, path(nickel, coin) requires
traveling only two nodes, leading to a value of 0.5.68 Figure 1 below
illustrates this concept.
FIGURE 1

64. Id.
65. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/?mode=w&s1=&w1=
nickel%23n%232&s2=&w2=coin%23n%231 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J3NCPRB8].
66. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 65.
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3. Quantifying Taxonomic Depth with Wup
Several algorithms complicate path by accounting for additional
variables. For example, the algorithm wup also measures how many
nodes are required to go from the most generalized hypernym in the
taxonomy to the two terms at issue and the LCS.69 This distance is
called taxonomic depth. For example, “entity” has a taxonomic depth of
2: there is no hypernym for “entity,” so wup counts the database as a
whole and the node “entity.”70 In contrast, “coin” has a taxonomic depth
of 10, as there are eight nodes between “coin” and the database. 71 The
terms “nickel” and “button” each have a taxonomic depth of 11 because
each has ten hypernyms.72 This concept is illustrated by Figure
2, below.
FIGURE 2

Once the algorithm wup calculates the taxonomic depth of the
LCS and the two terms at issue, it divides the depth of the LCS by the
sum of the taxonomic depth of the two terms at issue according to the
formula (2 x Depth_LCS) / (Depth_term1 + Depth_term2). This formula
acknowledges that if the terms at issue and the LCS are all deep into
the taxonomy, the terms are more specific and therefore more closely
related, causing wup to yield a higher fraction. For example,

69. See Zhibiao Wu & Martha Palmer, Verb Semantics and Lexical Selection, 1994 PROC. 32D
ANN. MEETING ON ASS’N FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 133, 137.
70. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63.
71. Id.
72. [Nickel#n#2, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 65.
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wup(nickel, coin) yields a value of 0.95.73 In contrast, if the LCS is
rather abstract and therefore shallow in the taxonomy, while the terms
at issue are deep into taxonomy, wup will yield a smaller fraction.74 The
value of wup(button, coin) is 0.19.75 Therefore, the higher the outcome
of wup, the higher the level of correlation between the two terms.
4. Considering Information Content with Res
Conversely, the algorithm res considers how many nodes fall
below a given term.76 This measurement is called information content.77
For example, although “metal” and “chemical element” share the same
taxonomic depth, “chemical element” contains more hyponyms than
“metal” does.78 Thus, when two terms share the LCS “metal,” they will
have higher information content than when two terms share only the
LCS “chemical element.”79 This concept is illustrated in Figure 3, below.
The algorithm res accounts for information content by measuring the
information content of the LCS relative to the size of the entire
taxonomy.80 Similar to wup, the less abstract and more specific the LCS,
the more its hyponyms will have in common.

73. Id.
74. See Wu & Palmer, supra note 69, at 137.
75. [Button#n#1, Coin#n#1], WS4J DEMO, supra note 63.
76. See Philip Resnik, Using Information Content to Evaluate Semantic Similarity in a
Taxonomy, 1 PROC. 14TH INT’L JOINT CONF. ON A.I. 448, 451–52 (1995).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.

496

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:483

This discussion demonstrates there are several linguistic
algorithms available that measure and quantify hierarchical
relationships in semantics. Research has shown a strong correlation
between the results of the algorithms and how humans perceive words
semantically.85 These algorithms consider overall distance (path),
taxonomic depth (wup), and information content (res). Path, wup, and
res are not the only linguistic algorithms available, but they provide a
useful starting point in helping to determine whether one term can be
categorized as another—a crucial determination in legal analysis.
II. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WORDNET AND THE ALGORITHMS
In many ways, computational linguistic tools may serve the
same function as traditional textual tools. As discussed in Section I.A,
a primary and uncontroversial purpose of employing textual tools is to
elicit meaning.86 Similarly, textual tools based on syntax illustrate
widely held, common-sense patterns of thinking in language and
communication.87 The algorithms serve all these functions: they elicit
meaning by illustrating hierarchical relationships and semantic
similarity of words, and they elucidate the cognitive classifications
humans have of words in a wholly objective, quantifiable manner.
Furthermore, the tools gain legitimacy through their close
relationship to other more well-established tools of legal analysis. As
tools of modern computational linguistics, WordNet and the algorithms
discussed above are analogous both to linguistic tools that have already
gained widespread acceptance in courts and to more modern,
quantitative tools that have increased in popularity in recent years.
This Section describes the justifications behind both classic linguistic
tools and recent quantitative tools and demonstrates that those
justifications similarly apply to WordNet and the algorithms path, wup,
and res.

85. For example, res has a correlation of r=0.79 with human experiments. See CHEN & SONG,
supra note 61, at 151.
86. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 18, at 454.
87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment
on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory
Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 688 (1992).
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A. Analogy to Other Linguistic Tools
Although courts use many classical linguistic tools in statutory
interpretation,88 three textual tools are particularly salient in justifying
also using WordNet and the algorithms: dictionaries, etymology, and
the last antecedent rule. This Section compares WordNet to dictionaries
and the algorithms to etymology and the last antecedent rule.
Dictionaries, etymology, and the last antecedent rule stem from
classical linguistic principles,89 and all three tools are frequently
employed in legal analysis.90 The justifications for these tools—
identifying semantic nuances and providing definitive, unbiased
clarity—also apply to WordNet and associated algorithms.
1. Dictionaries
Judges often use dictionaries as a principal textual tool.91
Lexicographers draft dictionaries based on linguistic surveys of usage
and the underlying goal of descriptivism, not prescriptivism. 92 For
example, Webster’s Third Dictionary’s 1936 definitions were based on
the editorial staff’s collection of 4.5 billion new usages of words from
excerpts of books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, catalogs, and
journals.93 There are many potential justifications for using dictionaries
as textual tools. First and foremost, dictionaries conveniently describe
the usage and meaning of words, giving full effect to the language of the
legal text.94 Indeed, using a dictionary to interpret legal language seems
so obvious that “[n]o defense seems necessary.”95
WordNet as a lexical database functions much like a dictionary
and shares many of the same legal justifications.96 As previously
88. For example, Professor Solan explains that judges act as linguists when interpreting
pronouns, the difference between “and” and “or,” and defining adjectives. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN,
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 38–59 (1993).
89. See, e.g., LYLE CAMPBELL, HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2013); Solan,
supra note 31, at 31.
90. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003); Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 128 (1998); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 497 (2014).
91. See Calhoun, supra note 90, at 497.
92. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 4a–5a (1993) (“Accuracy in
addition to requiring freedom from error and conformity to truth requires a dictionary to state
meanings in which words are in fact used, not to give editorial opinion on what their meanings
should be.”).
93. Id. at 4a.
94. See Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177,
2197 (2003).
95. Id.
96. See supra Section I.B.
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discussed, WordNet data is objectively gathered, quantified, and tagged
based on real and common usage by neutral linguists. 97 The data
gathered conveniently describes the usage and meaning of words,98
thereby giving full effect to legal text. While using WordNet to define
terms may not be as obvious to courts as using a dictionary,99 WordNet’s
utility and intricacies speak for themselves, as WordNet enables
computational analysis for semantic relatedness of terms.100
2. Etymology
Etymology is a byproduct of historical linguistics (a field of
linguistic study examining how languages evolve over time) that serves
as another classical textual tool.101 In Muscarello v. United States,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, illustrated that the word “carry”
can mean “carry in a car” in part because the Latin root of “carry”
shared the meaning of transportation by vehicle.102 Justice Thomas, in
his interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, also
relied on the etymology of “commerce” in explaining that “commerce”
can mean “with merchandise.”103 In fact, the Supreme Court’s use of
etymology as an interpretive tool dates at least as far back as the
1800s.104 The practice of using etymology to define and describe legal
terms may have its roots in Plato’s works. 105
Explicit justifications for the Court’s use of etymology are
sparse.106 At its most basic, etymology can help divine the meaning of
97. What Is WordNet?, supra note 43.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Robertson v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 552 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (deriding WordNet as an “internet dictionary” and “on-line lexical database” in comparison
to “the venerable Oxford English Dictionary”).
100. See infra Parts III and IV.
101. See CAMPBELL, supra note 89, at 5.
102. 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).
103. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
104. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 476 (1857); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 500–01 (1849); Patapsco Ins. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 222, 230 (1830); United States
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 106 (1820).
105. See James Williams, Legal Etymology, 328 LAW MAG. & REV. 257, 257 (1903).
106. It is this author’s opinion that the use of etymology in statutory interpretation is not
justified. Just like the sounds in words change over time, the meaning of words change over time
through processes such as broadening, narrowing, metaphor, amelioration, taboo replacement, and
pejoration. See CAMPBELL, supra note 89, at 223–25, 227–29 (overview of semantic and lexical
change); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and
the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1640 (2017) (“Because semantics, syntax, and
punctuation change over time, contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the
meaning of older texts.”); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1939–41 (2010)
(explaining that accepting a given meaning as valid due to etymology alone would lead to absurd
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particular antiquated or “fancy” words.107 In its more frequent legal use,
however, courts employ etymology to elucidate the meaning of a term.108
The study of etymology shows how and when a word originated through
its form and meaning.109 Therefore, judges who use etymology presume
that although the sounds and spelling of a word have changed over
time, the word retains at least a connotation of its historical meaning.
Etymology therefore aids judges in ascertaining the semantic nuances
of words.
Similarly, the algorithms quantify hierarchical relationships
and therefore the interrelatedness of terms.110 The results of employing
the algorithms reveal a level of interconnectedness that correlates to
cognitive perceptions of how related two words may be.111 Accordingly,
like etymology, the algorithms can help elucidate semantic nuances of
words that are not evident from their current dictionary definitions.
3. The Last Antecedent Rule
There are also many parallels between the algorithms and the
last antecedent rule. The last antecedent rule aligns with the cognitive
linguistic principle of “late closure,” which indicates that humans tend
to associate the newest words we process with the words we have
processed most recently.112 Under the last antecedent rule, a clause or
phrase should apply only to the noun or phrase immediately preceding
it. In an example provided by Justice Scalia, if parents going out of town
tell their teenager not to “throw a party or engage in any other activity
that damages the house,” the parents can still punish the teenager for
throwing a party that does not cause damage.113 In this colorful
example, the last antecedent rule dictates that the phrase “that
damages the house” applies only to the phrase “engage in any other

results). Further critique of etymology as a tool of statutory interpretation is outside the scope of
this paper, but this author believes that if judges can somehow justify using etymology in statutory
interpretation, WordNet and subsequent algorithms are also justifiable.
107. See Williams, supra note 105, at 267.
108. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).
109. See Robert Mailhammer, Introduction: Etymology Beyond Word Histories to LEXICAL AND
STRUCTURAL ETYMOLOGY: BEYOND WORD HISTORIES 2 (Robert Mailhammer ed., 2013).
110. See supra Section I.B.
111. See CHEN & SONG, supra note 61, at 149.
112. See SOLAN, supra note 88, at 31–32.
113. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003).
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activity.”114 Although judges have recently increased their usage of the
last antecedent rule, use of the rule goes as far back as at least 1799.115
Although the last antecedent rule garners a substantial amount
of critique,116 it boasts several potential justifications. First, the rule
acknowledges inherent ambiguities in the English language and
attempts to resolve them decisively.117 Additionally, the last antecedent
rule provides evidence of the “common sense” meanings of certain
phrases.118 Furthermore, employing the last antecedent rule to all legal
texts shows a lack of ideological bias, as the text may thereafter read to
align with more liberal or more conservative values.119
These same justifications support use of the algorithms. For
example, the algorithms acknowledge that there are hierarchical
structures to words in the English language and seek to quantify them
definitively.120 In addition, the algorithms elucidate cognitive
perceptions of what words mean and how they are related, which can
help shed light on how common people understand the words.121
Moreover, the algorithms are politically and ideologically neutral.
WordNet and the algorithms therefore have many of the same
justifications as more widely accepted linguistic textual tools. WordNet
and the algorithms objectively account for linguistic realities, elucidate
meanings of terms, highlight semantic nuances, and acknowledge
structural relationships.
B. Analogy to Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Quantitative Tool
The algorithms also share common justifications with the
quantitative textual tool, cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is
114. See id.
115. See Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent
in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325, 327, 336 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart,
Why Both Are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 5 (2015) (“A
court that resolved this ambiguity by applying the doctrine (or rule, or canon) of the last antecedent
would be a court that’s at a loss. And a court that uses it to support a decision made for other
reasons is throwing in a feather.”); Ross, supra note 115, at 326 (“Two recent Supreme Court
decisions have revealed that the decision to apply the Rule may be less a matter of common sense
than nonsensical statutory construction.”).
117. See Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous
Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING 81, 85 (1996).
118. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 443 (2020).
119. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
849, 887 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“Textualism could be used by liberals to equal (albeit
opposite) effect . . . .”).
120. See Wu & Palmer, supra note 69, at 136.
121. See What Is WordNet?, supra note 43.
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a tool that agencies use when deciding whether or how to promulgate a
regulation.122 Before an agency issues a significant regulatory action, it
must assess the anticipated benefits (including economic, health,
environmental, and social benefits) and anticipated costs (including
administrative, economic, health, environmental, and social costs) of
the regulation.123 Both Congress and the President have increasingly
asked for cost-benefit analysis from agencies, and courts have, with
increasing consistency, encouraged the initiative.124 Arguably, costbenefit analysis is just another tool of statutory interpretation that
happens to be designed for agencies: cost-benefit analysis can help an
agency determine what is “appropriate and necessary,”125 what is
“reasonably necessary or appropriate,”126 or what it means for
technology to be the “best” or “most advantageous”127 according to the
agency’s organic statute. For example, it is estimated that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) regulation on
passive restraints (or seatbelts), around the time of its enactment, cost
three hundred dollars for every life saved and saved 1,850 lives
annually.128 The Supreme Court determined that, given the data
surrounding the costs and benefits of the regulation on seatbelts,
NHTSA’s rescission of the regulation was “arbitrary and capricious.”129
One of many potential justifications for using cost-benefit
analysis as an interpretive tool is that cost-benefit analysis can help
overcome cognitive biases.130 For example, due to media attention or
current events, a particular risk may get overblown attention among
the public.131 Conversely, the public may underestimate or overlook a
higher, more problematic risk.132 Through quantitative and technical
evaluation, cost-benefit analysis can help correct the cognitive biases
that misestimate certain risks.133 Similarly, cost-benefit analysis can
help prevent emotions or hysteria from entering into interpretation of
122. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative
Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 323 (2001).
123. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
124. See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 324.
125. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708–09 (2015).
126. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607,
642–44 (1980).
127. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009).
128. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25, 30 (1986).
129. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
52 (1983).
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 1059,
1060 (2000).
131. See id. at 1066–67.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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a legal text.134 Although critics may argue that cost-benefit analysis
lacks precision or accuracy,135 it is still a pragmatic tool to provide
additional information to other qualitative assessments. 136
WordNet and its associated algorithms may also help overcome
cognitive biases in legal analysis. For example, a judge’s cognitive
perception of a word may differ from the general public’s perception of
the word, and the judge may misapply the word more narrowly or more
broadly than other legal practitioners or ordinary people would.137
Applying the algorithms to the words at issue would ensure greater
consistency across the legal field, as a judge would be less likely to
manipulate or pervert the level of semantic relatedness between two
terms according to his or her subjective preferences. Furthermore, the
particular facts and circumstances of a case may cause emotions to
distort a judge’s application of the law.138 Using the algorithms would
mitigate the effects of emotions on the judge’s ruling, as the
algorithms provide a more objective view into words’ meanings and
semantic relatedness.
More broadly, none of the analogous tools discussed in this
Section (dictionaries, etymology, the last antecedent rule, and costbenefit analysis) are intended to apply in isolation from other tools.139
Similarly, the algorithms should not be the sole deciding factor in cases
involving interpretation of legal texts, and judges may choose to
rightfully disregard algorithmic outcomes in favor of findings from
other textual tools. For example, disregarding algorithms in favor of
other interpretational tools may be justified if the algorithm’s results
are ambiguous, the algorithm leads to absurd results, all other textual
134. See id. at 1071.
135. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1984 (1998).
136. See Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1077 (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is best taken as pragmatic
instrument, agnostic on the deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex
judgments where multiple goods are involved.”).
137. See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1294 (2008) (“[A] judge may consider language
to be plain when in fact different people do not understand it the same way, and this may happen
even when the judge’s understanding is shared only by a minority of people in general.”).
138. See Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205, 212–15 (2002)
(arguing that the emotions envy and jealousy threaten the impartiality and competence of judges).
But see Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
629, 633 (2011) (arguing that the cultural script lauding judicial dispassion is both unrealistic and
detrimental to good judging).
139. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 754–55 (2015) (deciding that cost is one of multiple
relevant factors an agency should consider based on its statute); Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 128–30 (1998) (listing etymology as one source of support among many others, such as
modern dictionary definitions and common usages); Kimble, supra note 116, at 23 (finding that in
the vast majority of cases, the last antecedent rule was used as a supporting reason—not the main
reason—for interpreting the statute in a certain way).
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tools come out the other way, or legislative history clearly and
uniformly points in another direction. Nonetheless, the algorithms can
still help inform legal analysis by fulfilling the underlying justifications
of other more well-established legal analysis tools: WordNet and its
associated algorithms describe obscure semantic nuances, objectively
resolve ambiguity, and help overcome cognitive biases. Accordingly, the
legal field should incorporate WordNet and the algorithms as additional
textual tools in its analysis of legal texts.
III. CASE STUDY: IS HOLDING A PERSON AT GUNPOINT AND DIRECTING
THE PERSON NOT TO MOVE “PHYSICALLY RESTRAINING” THE PERSON?
This case study further illustrates how useful computational
semantic tools can be in legal analysis. Federal circuits currently split
in their interpretation of federal sentencing guidelines in terms of
whether pointing a gun at a person qualifies as physically restraining
the person. Section III.A provides more details on the circuit split,
including how traditional legal tools of interpretation preserve the
ambiguity. Section III.B applies WordNet and the algorithms to help
resolve the split.
A. Introducing the Circuit Split
Michael Anglin entered a bank in New York, gun in his hands.140
He ordered two bank tellers to get down on the floor and not to look at
him, thrusting the gun in one teller’s face for about fifteen seconds.141
At a bank in South Carolina, Elianer Dimache also pointed a gun at
three bank tellers, ordering one to empty her cash drawer and two
others to get on the floor and be quiet.142 Both Anglin and Dimache
followed the archetype of an armed bank robbery, as they brandished
guns and ordered tellers about.143 Both Anglin and Dimache were
convicted of armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113.144 Nonetheless,

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id.
United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 157.
Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 156.
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Anglin and Dimache received disparate treatment under federal
sentencing guidelines for roughly the same actions. 145
In the federal sentencing guideline for robbery, “if any person
was physically restrained in order to facilitate commission of the offense
or to facilitate escape,” the sentence should be increased by two levels.146
Another guideline for victim-related adjustments contains similar
language: “[I]f a victim was physically restrained in the course of an
offense, increase by [two] levels.”147 The commentary to the federal
sentencing guidelines defines “physically restrained” as “the forcible
restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”148
Judges are obligated to consider these guidelines as a preliminary
benchmark when issuing sentencing orders, but the guidelines are
advisory, rather than mandatory, in nature.149
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
indicated that brandishing a gun and telling someone not to move
qualifies as physically restraining the victim.150 On the other hand, the
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have decided that
threatening a victim with a gun is not a physical restraint under the
guidelines.151 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have switched positions
over time.152 The Third and Eighth Circuits apply the enhancement in
145. Compare Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604 (affirming the application of a sentencing
enhancement), with Anglin, 169 F.3d at 156, 163 (vacating a sentence for resentencing on the
grounds of misapplication of the sentencing enhancement).
146. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
147. Id. § 3A1.3.
148. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (providing factors to be considered in imposing a sentence); Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47–50, 56 (2007) (establishing that judges may impose sentences
outside of the guidelines as long as it is not an abuse of a discretion); Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (stating that courts will vary in their application of the sentencing guidelines);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (arguing that Congress wanted to permit
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences).
150. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1049–51 (6th Cir. 2012); Dimache, 665 F.3d at
604–05; United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace,
461 F.3d 15, 33–35 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 471–72 (4th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999).
151. United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Parker,
241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446,
460–62 (5th Cir. 1998).
152. Initially, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the enhancement should apply when the
defendant herded tellers into a bathroom with a sawed-off shotgun and violent threats, but the
court denied application of the enhancement in all instances of “herding.” See United States v.
Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992). Later, the court ruled that pointing a gun required
“something more,” which could include a “sustained focus” of the defendant on the victim. See
United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner affirmed the Carter
approach as governing. United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the
Seventh Circuit took a more definitive approach in the past year to align itself with other circuits
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cases where a gun is used to herd or move a victim but not in all cases
where a gun is pointed at a victim.153 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied a petition for writ of certiorari to review this split. 154
Notably, these circuit courts often used the same textual tools to
arrive at different results. For example, courts rarely employed
dictionaries when addressing this problem, but when they did, they met
conflicting information.155 The Sixth Circuit analyzed the meaning of
“forcible restraint,” noting that Black’s Law Dictionary provides an
illustrative example of holding someone at gunpoint in a robbery.156
When the Seventh Circuit supported using this enhancement more
frequently, it also defined “force” as encompassing “the operation of
circumstances that permit no alternative to compliance.”157 The Second
Circuit instead focused on defining “physical,” indicating that the
restraint must be “of the body as opposed to the mind.”158
All courts agreed that the list of actions contained in the
commentary (“being bound, tied, or locked up”) was intended to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive.159 Nonetheless, both camps
employed the principle ejusdem generis to arrive at drastically different
results. Ejusdem generis stands for the principle that if a legal text
provides a list, then unlisted terms should have a similar nature for the
provision to apply.160 Supporters of employing the sentencing
enhancement invoked the purpose of binding, tying, or locking someone
denying the use of the enhancement in this case. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 877. The Ninth Circuit
originally ruled that no touching is required to employ this enhancement, as evidenced by the
inclusion of “locked up” in the commentary. See United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th
Cir. 1997). This approach was later affirmed, as threatening a victim with a gun pragmatically
restrains the victim’s movement. See United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Ninth Circuit then invoked the “sustained focus” standard to distinguish the cases and hold
that pointing a gun at the victim and commanding the victim to get down did not qualify for this
enhancement. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (arguing that the victims must be moved into a
different room to constitute sustained focus).
153. See United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718, 720–22 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating a key factor
in determining physical restraint is if the victim is forced to move at gunpoint); United States v.
Greenstein, 322 F. App’x. 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2009) (providing that physical restraint
encompasses herding victims into a separate room).
154. Coleman v. United States, 566 U.S. 914, 914 (2012).
155. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 534 (positing that deciding which statute or rule
governs the issue in the case can make all the difference).
156. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 2012).
157. Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 513 (10th ed. 1981)).
158. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting WEBSTER’S DELUXE
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1353 (1979)).
159. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Parker,
241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999); Anglin, 169 F.3d at 163; United
States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461 (5th Cir. 1998).
160. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438 (2020).
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up: restricting movement and forcing compliance.161 Using a gun can be
as effective at restricting someone’s movement and forcing compliance
as using traditional forms of restraint.162
On the other hand, courts leaning against employing the
sentencing enhancement claimed the list invokes a requirement of
physical contact or barrier with the victims. 163 Moreover, the sentencing
enhancement at issue focuses on the actions of the defendant, not the
victim; the victim’s reaction to move or not to move when faced
with a gun should not determine whether the sentencing
enhancement applies.164
Interestingly, also under ejusdem generis, some courts on both
sides of the split found a need for the defendant to exert a “sustained
focus” on the victim in order for this enhancement to apply.165
Proponents of employing the enhancement contended that holding
someone at gunpoint involves intense, personal interaction between the
robber and the victim, even though there may never be any physical
contact.166 The Ninth Circuit posited that pointing or brandishing a gun
does not involve such intense interaction.167
When examined as a whole, the sentencing guidelines caution
against “double counting” the same aggravating or mitigating factors.168
Under the guidelines for robbery, defendants may also receive
sentencing enhancements for the discharge, use, brandishing, or
possession of a firearm.169 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit notes
161. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1049–50; United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir.
2011); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34.
162. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1050; Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605 (quoting the district court,
“[T]hat gun is, I think, just as effective, if not more effective, in restraining [the victims] as duct
tape or some kind of twine or rope would have been as well.”); Miera, 539 F.3d at 1235–36.
163. E.g., United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019); Anglin, 169 F.3d at
164 (“[I]f § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) said only that the enhancement would apply ‘if any person was
restrained,’ the courts would become involved in mental, moral, philosophical, even theological
considerations, in addition to physical ones. No, the restraint must be ‘physical’ . . . .”); Drew, 200
F.3d at 880.
164. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 876.
165. See United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Parker,
241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. See Coleman, 664 F.3d at 1050 (holding the defendant exerted a “sustained focus” on the
victim when ordering the victim to move around at gunpoint); Wallace, 461 F.3d at 34 (finding that
a victim was physically restrained in part due to the defendant’s blocking of the victim’s path and
aiming a gun at the victim’s face and chest at close range). But cf. Miera, 539 F.3d at 1235–36
(determining that there is no requirement for prolonged individual interaction for this sentencing
guideline but finding that it would be met by waving a gun around at the room).
167. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19 (reasoning that Congress must have meant for the
enhancement to include something more than brandishing a gun because nearly all armed
robberies include such an act).
168. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
169. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2).
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that the enhancement of sentences for both brandishing a firearm and
physically restraining a person qualifies as “double counting.”170
The Sixth Circuit rejects this argument, holding that the
singular action may have discrete and separate effects that warrant
separate enhancements.171
Identifying the intention of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
drafting these guidelines is also murky. The Fourth Circuit posits that
the enhancement was intended to punish the defendant for depriving a
person of his or her ability to move.172 Other courts note that, if this
sentencing enhancement were applied every time a defendant
threatened someone with a firearm, every armed robbery would receive
this enhancement.173 They therefore assert that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission must have intended the sentencing enhancement to be
restricted to more narrow circumstances.174
Considered in toto, traditional tools preserve the ambiguity
surrounding whether holding a victim at gunpoint and ordering the
person to move or not to move qualifies as physically restraining the
victim. Many of the tools, particularly ejusdem generis, can be employed
to achieve opposite results. When interpreting the meaning of the
sentencing enhancement, judges should therefore look to linguistics for
clarity on the meaning of “restrain.” WordNet and the algorithms path,
wup, and res help elucidate the plain meaning of the language.
B. Applying Algorithms to the Circuit Split
Employing the computational linguistic tools analyzed in
Section I.B helps interpret the legal language and resolve the circuit
split. As measured by WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and res,
“gun” and “firearm” are closely related enough to “restraint” to legally
permit using the sentence enhancement.175
First, it is important to frame the legal question in a measurable
way. After all, legal analysis involves the matching of a real-life
scenario with the words in a legal text, and the real-life scenario must

170. See United States v. Taylor, 620 F.3d 812, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2010).
171. United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997).
172. United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011).
173. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It would require a quixotic robber to display his gun,
and then say to the tellers or bank customers, ‘this is a holdup, but feel free to move about the
bank, and if any of you have to leave for an appointment elsewhere, that’s fine.’ ”); United States
v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461–62 (5th Cir. 1998).
174. See Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 165.
175. See infra Table 4.
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therefore be carefully put into words first.176 In the circuit split, courts
asked broadly whether holding a person at gunpoint and ordering the
person not to move qualified as physical restraint.177 For the sake of
analysis, it is helpful to have distinct words rather than entire phrases,
as entire phrases lead to more difficult quantification and may not be
available in WordNet.178 Accordingly, this analysis answers the
question of whether a “gun” or “firearm” can qualify as a “restraint.”
Admittedly, this does lend itself to some slight semantic differences, as
the actions of pointing a gun at a person and any verbal cues given are
potentially material to judges’ evaluation of the situation and
interpretation of the guideline.179 At the heart of their analyses,
however, courts are evaluating whether a gun can be used in place of a
rope, twine, or handcuffs (which obviously qualify as restraints) in order
to control the victim.180
Next, the precise senses used are crucial to the analysis. In
WordNet, the term “restraint” has six senses, 181 and the sentencing
guideline is ambiguous as to which one it supports.182 Because this
analysis measures ISA relationships, it is most helpful to pick the sense
that has the most hyponyms that are similar to what judges would
think of as restraints.183 The sixth sense of “restraint” fits this criterion,
as it contains hyponyms such as “band,” “chain,” “knot,” “lock,” “gag,”
and “leash.”184 Therefore, this analysis uses the sixth sense of
“restraint.” In addition, because the terms “gun” and “firearm” are

176. Cf. Solan, supra note 31, at 1072 (contending that linguistics is helpful when applying the
law to real-life scenarios).
177. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text.
178. The phrase “hold at gunpoint” is not available on WordNet. [Hold at gunpoint],
WORDNET,
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=hold+at+gunpoint&sub=Search+
WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3E47-ZRWP].
179. See United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1050 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that the
defendant’s verbal orders to walk out of his office rather than remain in place were material to the
determination of whether the defendant restrained the victim).
180. See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting the district court
comparing the gun used to a rope or piece of twine).
181. In WordNet, “restraint” can mean: (1) “the act of controlling by restraining someone or
something,” (2) “discipline in personal and social activities,” (3) “the state of being physically
constrained,” (4) “a rule or condition that limits freedom,” (5) “lack of ornamentation,” or (6) “a
device that retards something’s motion.” [Restraint], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.
princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=restraint&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5
=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y5LG-PMW3].
182. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(“ ‘Physically restrained’ means the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound up,
or locked up.”).
183. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
184. [Restraint], WORDNET, supra note 181.
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interpretation of policy exceptions under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Section IV.B then applies the
algorithms to the circuit split to further illustrate the semantic
nuances of the words at issue and the potential utility of WordNet and
the algorithms.
A. Introducing the Circuit Split
Under ERISA, a fiduciary has the duty to discharge a benefits
plan in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.204
Plans may contain exceptions, conditions, and exemptions; for example,
many life insurance policies pay premiums for “accidental” deaths, but
deaths caused by “intentionally self-inflicted injury” do not qualify as
“accidental.”205 ERISA grants beneficiaries the right to bring suits to
enforce their plans in federal courts,206 and courts typically interpret
plans based on federal common law.207 Federal common law currently
dictates that courts interpret plans according to their plain meaning
from the perspective of a reasonable layperson.208
Federal circuits diverge as to whether the exception for deaths
caused by “self-inflicted injury” applies to deaths caused by autoerotic
asphyxiation.209 Autoerotic asphyxiation is “the practice of limiting the
flow of oxygen to the brain during masturbation in an attempt to
heighten sexual pleasure.”210 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have
indicated that autoerotic asphyxiation qualifies as a “self-inflicted
injury,” thereby blocking beneficiaries of the decedents from receiving
benefits under some accidental-death plans.211 On the other hand, the
Second and Ninth Circuits have indicated that autoerotic asphyxiation
is not a “self-inflicted injury,” thus interpreting the plans in favor of the
204. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
205. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins., 922 F.3d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 2019).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
207. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1987) (describing how ERISA’s civil
enforcement provision was based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Labor Management
Relations Act, which provision the Supreme Court held had preemptive force that entirely
displaced any state cause of action).
208. E.g., Tran, 922 F.3d at 382; Padfield v. AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
209. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 (autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-inflicted injury); Critchlow
v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2004) (autoerotic asphyxiation
was not a self-inflicted injury); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129 (autoerotic asphyxiation was not
a self-inflicted injury); Todd v. AIG Life Ins., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (autoerotic
asphyxiation was not a self-inflicted injury); Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins., 663 F.2d 49, 49–50
(8th Cir. 1981) (autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-inflicted injury).
210. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1450.
211. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 386; Sigler, 663 F.2d at 49–50.
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beneficiaries.212 Judges on the Ninth, Seventh, and Second Circuits
have issued dissenting opinions. 213 The Supreme Court denied review
of the split in 2002.214 While the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on whether
autoerotic asphyxiation is a “self-inflicted injury,” it has indicated that
deaths caused by autoerotic asphyxiation are “accidental.”215 Even
though not all federal circuits have directly ruled on this issue, the split
permeates federal district courts and state courts, as well. 216 Although
the question of a death being “accidental” and the question of a death
being caused by “self-inflicted injury” are not mutually exclusive,217
courts tend to find that when a death is truly accidental, it is not caused
by self-inflicted injury.218
When deciding whether the exclusion applies, judges look to
define a “self-inflicted injury.” If the term is defined in a plan, the judges
will use the definition provided.219 For example, in one of its ERISA
plans, AIG Life Insurance Company defined “injury” as “bodily injury
caused by an accident occurring while this policy is in force as to the
Insured Person and resulting directly and independently of all other
causes in loss covered by this policy.”220 When the term is undefined or
the definition leaves the ambiguity intact, courts aim to interpret the
term from the perspective of a reasonable layperson.221 Courts may then
use dictionaries in their analysis.222 The dissenting judge in the Ninth
Circuit further applied elemental analysis to the “plain meaning” of the
plan and ruled that an “intentionally self-inflicted injury” has three
elements: (1) the act is upon oneself, (2) the act is done with an intent

212. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260, 264; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129.
213. Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 265 (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1130 (Leavy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
214. AIG Life Ins. v. Padfield, 537 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2002).
215. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452, 1459 (noting that the plan at-issue included no general
exclusion for self-inflicted injury).
216. Compare Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that
autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury), with Bennett v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp.
201, 212–13 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (positing that death by autoerotic asphyxiation may be accidental);
compare also Conn. Gen. Life Ins. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. App. 1981) (finding under
Texas law that autoerotic asphyxiation did not constitute self-inflicted injury), with Sims v.
Monumental Gen. Ins., 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding under Louisiana law that
autoerotic asphyxiation did constitute a self-inflicted injury).
217. See Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *20 (S.D.
Ohio June 28, 2000).
218. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260, 264; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127, 1129.
219. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452.
220. Id.
221. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 384.
222. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452.
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to injure, and (3) an injury occurs.223 Determining that the decedent
intended to asphyxiate himself and death did result, the judge found
application of the exclusion appropriate.224
According to federal common law in ERISA litigation, whether
an act qualifies as “intentional, self-inflicted injury” or “accidental” can
turn on the following test: (1) whether the decedent had the subjective
intent and expectation to survive uninjured, and (2) whether that
expectation was objectively reasonable.225 Most courts acknowledge
that the decedents had the subjective intention to survive and were not
suicidal.226 Courts differ, however, on how “reasonable” the expectation
of lack of injury is. For example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
even if the asphyxiation were not supposed to be lethal, a reasonable
person would think that being partially choked was an injury.227 In
contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits held that the decedents’
expectations of a lack of injury were reasonable, especially given
that the decedents in those cases had previous experience with
autoerotic asphyxiation.228
Indeed, data on the dangers and prevalence of autoerotic
asphyxiation can support either expectation. On the one hand,
autoerotic asphyxiation is so “widely practiced” that it has “permeated
popular culture and has become a commonplace punchline.”229
Engaging in autoerotic asphyxiation usually has a nonfatal outcome.230
On the other hand, autoerotic asphyxiation causes approximately one
to two deaths per million people per year, meaning that the annual
death toll for U.S. citizens dying from autoerotic asphyxiation numbers
in the hundreds.231
Further analyzing the nature of the act also yields mixed
analysis. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits separate the act
of autoerotic asphyxiation from death by noting that engaging in a risky
activity is not ipso facto injurious.232 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit
223. Padfield v. AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (Leavy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 1131.
225. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 385; Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246,
257–58 (2d Cir. 2004); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129.
226. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1126–27.
227. Tran, 922 F.3d at 384.
228. Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1130.
229. Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
230. See Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1125–26.
231. Id. at 1125 (citing Bennett v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 201, 204
(N.D.N.Y. 1997)).
232. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 260 (holding that ruling otherwise “tends to merge the concepts
of intent and result”); Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129 (“[V]oluntary risky acts resulting in injury are
not necessarily acts that result in ‘intentionally self-inflicted injury.’ ”).
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highlights the continuity of the act and points out that there is no
intervening cause between the decedent’s autoerotic asphyxiation and
his death.233
Courts’ standards of review of ERISA plans weigh in the
disputed beneficiaries’ favor. In cases of ambiguity, courts tend to find
in favor of the insured.234 In some jurisdictions, the insurer has the
burden of proving that an exclusion to benefits applies, and courts read
such exclusions narrowly.235
In summary, courts can use the same traditional tools to support
opposing conclusions as to whether autoerotic asphyxiation may qualify
as an “accidental” death or as a death caused by “self-inflicted injury.”
Traditional definitions, subjective versus objective reasoning, data, and
causation analysis yield conflicting results. Especially given that courts
must interpret plain language as a common layperson would,236
linguistic tools can offer strong support in resolving the circuit split.237
B. Applying Algorithms to the Circuit Split
Applying the algorithms resolves the circuit split in favor of
qualifying autoerotic asphyxiation as a “self-inflicted injury.” After
determining the appropriate test terms, linguistic analysis shows that
“asphyxiation” is more related to “injury” than it is to “accident.”238 This
follows the pattern of the well-established injury of “cuts” and deviates
from a traditional “accident,” such as a car crash.239 WordNet and its
associated algorithms therefore once again illuminate the semantic
nuances of the different terms.
Unfortunately, the current configuration of WordNet does not
permit the comparison of adjectives.240 Therefore, it is technologically
infeasible to use the computational semantic tools to analyze whether
autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an intentional, self-inflicted
injury.241 Notwithstanding this limitation, initial linguistic analysis
shows that the inability to quantify adjectives does not preclude
233. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 384.
234. See id. at 382; Todd v. AIG Life Ins., 47 F.3d 1448, 1452–53 (5th Cir. 1995).
235. See Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 256 (asserting that ambiguous terms should be construed
against the insurer particularly when the ambiguity is found in an exclusionary clause).
236. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 382; Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1125.
237. See infra Section IV.B.
238. See infra Table 5.
239. See infra Tables 6 and 7.
240. See [Intentional#a#1, Autoerotic#a#1], WS4J DEMO, http://ws4jdemo.appspot.com/?
mode=w&s1=&w1=intentional%23a%231&s2=&w2=autoerotic%23a%231 (last visited Dec. 15,
2020) [https://perma.cc/T6PJ-PAS8] (showing a pair of adjectives is unsupported by the program).
241. Id.

516

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:483

application of the algorithms to this circuit split. The prefix “auto” in
“autoerotic” is a reflexive, meaning it describes an act someone does to
himself or herself.242 Therefore, “auto” is synonymous with “selfinflicted.”243 Similarly, in this context, the fact that an act was “erotic”
means that it was also largely intentional; the decedents in
these cases intended to restrict their airflow to increase their
sexual gratification.244
Consequently, the remaining question is whether “asphyxiation”
may constitute an “injury,” or whether it is more like an “accident.” As
discussed above, these terms are not mutually exclusive,245 but when
courts find an act to be accidental, it is usually not a self-inflicted
injury.246 As discussed in Section III.B, choosing the senses of words to
use in analysis can affect the outcome. This analysis uses the most
common sense of asphyxiation—“the condition of being deprived of
oxygen”—because the only other sense of the word prejudged that the
act would end in death.247 Similarly, this analysis employs the first
sense of “injury” as meaning “any physical damage to the body” because
latter senses had fewer hyponyms and distinct connotations.248 In
addition, the first sense of “accident” is more pertinent to this analysis
because it has the connotation of misfortune rather than good luck.249
Applying the algorithms yields the results illustrated in Table 5.

242. See Aut-, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aut- (last
visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2J8K-NG9S].
243. “Self-inflicted” is defined as “inflicted or caused by oneself.” Self-inflicted, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-inflicted (last visited Dec. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/XTV4-6P4V].
244. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins., 922 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2019).
245. See Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *20 (S.D.
Ohio June 28, 2000).
246. See Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2004)
(determining that decedent’s death was accidental and was not a self-inflicted injury); Padfield v.
AIG Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (indicating that voluntary acts that result
in injury are not necessarily self-inflicted).
247. The other sense of “asphyxiation” was “killing by depriving of oxygen.” [Asphyxiation],
WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=asphyxiation&sub=Search+WordNe
t&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h=00000 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/UGS2-T4JX].
248. The second sense of “injury” had a connotation of “accident”; other senses involved
combat, physical damage, or legal injuries. [Injury], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/
perl/webwn?s=injury&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=
&o4=&h=00 (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TEK5-ZM8J].
249. [Accident], WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=accident&sub
=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o8=1&o1=1&o7=&o5=&o9=&o6=&o3=&o4=&h= (last visited Dec.
15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FFD6-628Y].
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algorithms as textual tools.266 As with the previous case study, judges
may give special analytical weight to contextual considerations that
tend to tip the scale in favor of the decedents. Nonetheless, the
algorithms aid in uncovering and quantifying the semantic nuances
present in ambiguous insurance plans, deciding cases involving
autoerotic asphyxiation consistently across circuits, and overcoming
potential cognitive biases in cases where the decedent may be
particularly sympathetic or the cause of death especially taboo.267
CONCLUSION
The law is a profession of words, and lawyers are wordsmiths by
trade. The common usage of textual tools to analyze legal authorities
illustrates the importance of linguistic analysis to the law. Linguistics,
particularly the fields of computational linguistics and semantics, can
help shed light on the plain meaning of words. And yet, computational
linguistic tools have so far been largely overlooked by the legal field.
This Note seeks to correct this oversight by showing that computational
semantic tools (WordNet and the algorithms path, wup, and res) are
approachable, easy to use, helpful, and accurate. The tools uncover
semantic nuances in words and objectively resolve difficult legal
questions, blind to potential cognitive biases and context. For example,
employing the linguistic tools to current circuit splits showed that
firearms and guns could be used to physically restrain a person and that
autoerotic asphyxiation was more strongly associated with injuries
than with accidents. Although this Note limited the algorithms’ use to
resolving two circuit splits, the possibilities for the algorithms’ further
potential benefits in answering legal questions are endless.
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